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Summary: This article deals with the question of the extent to which 
the national regulation of minimum wages is infl uenced by the Euro-
pean Community’s legal order. Firstly, it analyses the case law of the 
European Court of Justice with regard to Article 49 of the EC Treaty, 
which indicates that there is an increasing tendency to restrict the 
ability to extend a host state’s minimum wage to foreign service pro-
viders. It then examines the Posted Workers Directive in the light of 
the Laval and Rüffert cases, which are seen as unexpected interpre-
tations of the Directive and which will have an infl uence on the social 
models of some Member States. Finally, the article focuses on Croatia 
as a Non-Member State and its obligations, which derive from the Sta-
bilisation and Association Agreement, regarding the Posted Workers 
Directive.
The European Union is a territory of 27 social systems and each sys-
tem is a different species. Thus, there are 27 minimum wage rates and 27 
ways of establishing them. Undertakings which try to provide their serv-
ices in another Member State with their own workers have to comply with 
the minimum wages of the host Member State. Therefore, changing the 
place of their work entails a change in their expenses with regard to their 
workforce. In addition, employers have to become acquainted with the 
different models of establishing minimum wages. Overall, an obligation 
to comply with the minimum wage in the host Member State is an ad-
ditional burden for foreign service providers. Such a restriction, however, 
was considered by the Court to be a justifi ed restriction, at least in princi-
ple. Yet, there are some exceptions, the development of which can be fol-
lowed through the Court’s case law from Rush Portuguesa to Dirk Rüffert. 
The purpose of this article is to show to what extent Member States are 
free to impose their wages on foreign service providers. We shall fi rstly 
analyse the case law in relation to Article 49 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, then the Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC 
and afterwards the case law in the light of the Directive. Finally, we shall 
describe the present situation in Croatia regarding minimum wages and 
show how it conforms to the free provision of services. 
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I. Minimum wages and Article 49 in the Court’s case law
The question of minimum wages and their infl uence on free move-
ment arises specifi cally in the context of the free provision of services. 
Undertakings established in one Member State have the right to provide 
their services in another Member State and then return to their home 
state (their service is only temporary so they cannot fall under rules re-
lating to establishment).1 This right encompasses the right to move to 
another Member State with their entire workforce. The Court took this 
stance in Rush Portuguesa,2 which was a case concerning an undertaking 
established in Portugal constructing railway lines in France. For this pur-
pose it did not use French workers but its own workers. The Court found 
that the French law precluding foreign service providers from using their 
own workforce was discriminatory since domestic service providers could 
use their workforce without restrictions.3
In the same judgement, the Court also confi rmed that Member 
States are free to extend their legislation or collective agreements to post-
ed workers. As Barnard notices,4 the Court, by allowing the extension of 
Member States’ legislation, referred to the question of social dumping. If 
it had precluded the extension, it would have allowed undertakings from 
Member States with lower social standards to gain a competitive advan-
tage in Member States with higher ones (even though Rush Portuguesa 
did not concern minimum wages specifi cally). This approach is restricted 
in the Court’s later judgements where it treats the extension of national 
legislation as a restriction on the free provision of services, which is in 
principle justifi ed but is still subject to certain restrictions and, of course, 
to the proportionality test. 
1. Arblade - setting down the fi rst rules of the game
One of the fi rst cases where the Court found that Member States may 
impose their minimum wages on foreign employers was Arblade.5 This 
1  According to the Court in Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e 
Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-04165, if an undertaking were to provide services regu-
larly in one Member State, then it would be considered as established in that Member State 
and would have to comply with all of its legislation such as legislation on minimum wages.
2  Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Offi ce national d’immigration [1990] ECR I-01417.
3  The workers of the Portuguese service provider were actually third country nationals. 
France had some restrictions on these kinds of workers while for French service providers 
these restrictions did not apply. 
4  Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (2nd edn Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 369.
5  Joined cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade 
and Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL 
(C-376/96) [1999] ECR I-08453.
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was a case concerning a French undertaking constructing a complex of 
silos in Belgium. During construction, representatives from the Belgium 
Social Law Inspectorate requested that Arblade produce the relevant so-
cial documents. Arblade and Leloup were prosecuted for not being able 
to produce them on the construction site and for paying their workers 
a wage which was lower than the minimum wage fi xed by the collective 
agreements declared universally applicable. In their defence, Arblade and 
Leloup argued that they only had to comply with French legislation, since 
they were established in France and that the Belgian legislation regarding 
minimum wages and social documents was contrary to Articles 59 and 
60 of the Treaty.6 The Court took the same stance as in Rush Portuguesa: 
Member States are free to extend their legislation and collective agree-
ments regarding minimum wages to employers providing services within 
their territory. On the other hand, the Court restricted this right to an 
extension in two ways. Firstly, the Belgian authorities had to recognise 
certain pecuniary advantages guaranteed to posted workers as a part of 
the minimum wage. As a result, the level of the French minimum wage 
was closer to the Belgian wage. Secondly, the Court precluded criminal 
prosecution in cases when legislative provisions concerning minimum 
wages are insuffi ciently precise and accessible. Member States just have 
to ensure legislation on minimum wages for foreign employers is as sim-
ple as possible. This is one of the reasons why the Court restricted the 
exercise of the fundamental right to strike in the Laval case.7
To summarise, Arblade is the confi rmation of Member States’ right 
to impose minimum wages on foreign employers. However, the Court 
at the same time tried to achieve a balance. Such an approach by the 
Court is more benefi cial for new Member States with lower minimum 
wages. By recognising certain pecuniary advantages that posted work-
ers are being paid as a part of a minimum wage, the Court decreased 
the difference between the minimum wage of a home Member State and 
host Member State. For this reason, employers do not have to increase 
the wages of their workers as much as the host Member States would 
like them to. 
 In addition, the principle of legal certainty as regards legislation on 
minimum wages ensures that foreign service providers may plan their 
expenses before they start providing their services in another Member 
State. In this way, the Court tried to facilitate the position of service pro-
viders, which fi nd it very hard to become acquainted with often complex 
6  Now EC Treaty (Treaty of Rome) articles 49 and 50. 
7  Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska By-
ggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] 
ECR 00000.
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systems for establishing minimum wages and quite harsh punishments 
if they break these rules.8 
2. Mazzoleni - adding some balancing 
Although the proportionality test was mentioned as a requirement for 
any restriction on the freedom to provide services in Arblade, it was not 
until Mazzoleni9 that it was used for minimum wages. Mr Mazzoleni was 
the owner of a company called ISA which was established in France and 
which sent security offi cers to shopping malls in Belgium. Again, posted 
workers were paid the French minimum wage and not the Belgian one. 
To distinguish his situation from that in Arblade, Mr Mazzoleni argued 
that his workers, although paid a wage lower than the minimum, enjoyed 
protection that was essentially comparable to that of Belgian workers. 
He based this claim on the fact that taxation in France was lower than 
in Belgium and therefore French workers were protected essentially the 
same as Belgian ones. The Court held that this was a special circum-
stance of an undertaking established in a frontier region. Thus, Member 
States in certain circumstances such as this one have to assess whether 
the extension of their minimum wage is necessary and proportionate. 
When making such an assessment, they have to take into account the 
overall position of a posted worker and include not only the wage but 
also the taxation which he or she is obliged to pay as well as social se-
curity contributions. Otherwise, imposing the domestic minimum wage 
might not be proportionate to the attainment of the legitimate objective 
of protecting workers. In other words, it is presumed that pursuing the 
legitimate objective of protecting workers is proportionate only if the over-
all protection of posted workers is not better than that of domestic ones. 
Therefore, the lowest level of protection guaranteed to domestic workers 
becomes the highest level of protection which can be sought for posted 
ones (by enacting the Posted Workers Directive it will become the lowest 
level as well).  
In addition, the Court took into consideration the position of the 
service provider more specifi cally. It held that national rules might result 
in a disproportionate burden if the employer would have to calculate the 
wages on an hourly basis depending on which Member State the em-
ployee performs his or her work in. Therefore, the additional protection 
of workers might be too small to justify an additional administrative bur-
8  Any simplifi cations of their obligations become even more important for them when one 
bears in mind that services are always provided for a limited period of time in another 
Member State.
9  Case C-165/98 Criminal proceedings against André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance As-
sistance SARL, as the party civilly liable, third parties: Eric Guillaume and Others [2001] ECR 
I-02189.
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den imposed on the employer. The increase in wages could simply be too 
small in comparison to the employer’s obligation to calculate them. 
The Court actually obliged Member States to apply the proportional-
ity test in the strict sense. This means they have to weigh the costs for the 
employers in comparison to the benefi ts for the posted workers. Imposing 
the test, the Court actually stressed that the interests of workers do not 
take precedence over the interests of employers.
In Mazzoleni, new restrictions were imposed on the right to extend 
national legislation to posted workers. Member States have to take into 
consideration the overall position of posted workers, calculating taxation 
and social security contributions in the minimum wage. They also need 
to evaluate the real benefi ts for posted workers in relation to the costs for 
employers.
The test of proportionality seems to be quite new in the Court’s case 
law regarding minimum wages, although it was mentioned in Arblade 
(though not applied). The Court found the test useful in Mazzoleni since 
it was of the opinion that it was a special circumstance concerning an un-
dertaking established in a frontier region. It could thus be concluded that 
imposing minimum wages on foreign service providers is in most cases 
proportionate (since the Court did not use the test in Arblade). However, 
Member States have to take additional care and use the test when they 
intend to impose a wage in special circumstances like the one which 
arose in Mazzoleni. Such special circumstances have not been enumer-
ated by the Court so far and the safest solution for the authorities would 
be to apply the proportionality test in each case since any case might be 
a special circumstance. 
3. Portugaia Construções and Laval - respecting equality
Arblade and Mazzoleni were cases about minimum wages which had 
been prescribed by collective agreements declared universally applicable. 
In Portugaia Construções10 and Laval another problem concerning the 
unequal treatment of foreign and domestic employers arose. Portugaia 
was a case about a collective agreement establishing minimum wages 
which had to be observed by all foreign undertakings, but at the same 
time did not have to be observed by those domestic undertakings which 
had signed a different collective agreement. Therefore, they could agree 
on lower wages than the “minimum”. Laval concerned a Swedish law 
precluding trade unions from starting collective action against those em-
ployers paying their workers wages lower than the “usual” but which had 
signed collective agreements. At the same time, it allowed such collective 
10  Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções Ldª  [2002] ECR I-00787.
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action against foreign employers (the facts of the case are presented in 
more detail in the second part of the article).
In  both cases, the Court found the measures to be directly discrimi-
natory and that they could only be justifi ed by express Treaty provisions, 
not by overriding reasons relating to public interest. Thus, neither in 
Portugaia nor in Laval could a Member State invoke the protection of 
workers, since this is not considered by the Court as grounds for public 
policy. It is quite obvious why the Court narrowed the grounds for the 
justifi cation of such measures. They are intended to protect domestic 
employers rather than workers. Such a goal was considered by the Court 
in Portugaia to be an economic aim and therefore unacceptable.
If a Member State truly had the protection of workers as its objective 
then, for example, in Portugaia, Germany would have extended the mini-
mum wage to all domestic workers, and in Laval, Sweden would have 
allowed collective action against domestic employers who had signed col-
lective agreements, and not only against foreign employers. 
To summarise, Member States, although free to extend their legisla-
tive provisions or collective agreements on minimum wages, have to exer-
cise a certain degree of restraint. Minimum wages and any other legisla-
tion in relation to wages has to be applied equally to foreign and domestic 
service providers. Such a measure has to be made accessible to foreign 
employers so they may become acquainted with the minimum wage 
which is to be applied to them. The necessity of such measures needs to 
be assessed in the light of taxation and social security contributions and 
it should not become a disproportionate burden for the employer. 
Overall, it seems that the Court limited its approach in Rush Portu-
guesa, which gave Member States quite broad possibilities to extend their 
legislation on minimum wages to foreign services providers. In Arblade, it 
enhanced the cross-border provision of services by introducing the prin-
ciple of legal certainty when minimum wages are being applied. On the 
other hand, in Mazzoleni, the Court emphasised that in certain circum-
stances minimum wages of a host Member State cannot be applied to 
foreign service providers at all due to the fact that it might constitute a 
disproportionate measure. 
So far we have seen the limits within which Article 49 has kept Mem-
ber States’ autonomy to extend their legislation to foreign service provid-
ers. Turning to the Posted Workers Directive, we shall now analyse how 
the situation has changed because of the new restrictions that the Direc-
tive imposes and see how Member States have acclimatised to it.
II. The Posted Workers Directive
After the Court’s ruling in Rush Portuguesa, Member States were left 
with the impression that they were free to impose their legislation upon 
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foreign service providers. However, when the Commission proposed the 
fi rst draft of the future Posted Workers Directive, this sense of security 
was proved to be false.11
1. The aim of the Directive
Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services was adopted on 16 December 1996 and has caused a lot of con-
troversy ever since. It is based on Articles 47(2) and 55 of the Treaty,12 
and according to the 5th recital of its preamble, is intended to promote the 
transnational provision of services, at the same time ensuring a climate 
of fair competition and guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers. 
Nonetheless, recital 13 reveals the somewhat dubious nature of the Di-
rective’s aim. It states that ‘the laws of the Member States must be coor-
dinated in order to lay down a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum 
protection’ of posted workers. One of these, according to Article 3(1)c of 
the Directive, is the minimum wage. Reading the Preamble and Article 
3(1) we are faced with the question - is the Posted Workers Directive just 
aimed at facilitating the free provision of services, or does it also aim to 
create some substantive rights for posted workers? 
This, at fi rst glance, theoretical doubt, can be of crucial importance. 
As can be seen from Article 3(1), Member States must ensure that under-
takings which post workers to their territory respect certain conditions of 
employment which are laid down by laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions and, in the building sector, also by collective agreements de-
clared universally applicable, as defi ned in Article 3(8)2. However, what 
if a Member State has neither legislation nor universally applicable col-
lective agreements concerning the minimum wage like Sweden or Italy? 
Would it then be obliged to enact any? If we take the stand that the Direc-
tive only identifi es the mandatory rules in force in the host Member State, 
than that Member State would certainly not have to introduce any new 
legislation. The aim of the Directive, ie facilitating transnational provision 
of services, is in this case achieved as it is clear for foreign undertakings 
that they do not have to pay the host state’s minimum wage (because 
there isn’t one). Such a situation is almost perfect for them because no 
additional burden is placed upon them, neither an administrative nor 
economic one. It can also be argued that both posted and domestic work-
11  For further readings on the carving of the Directive see Paul Davies, ‘European Develop-
ments - The Posted Workers Directive and the EC Treaty’ (2002) 31 ILJ 298; Paul Davies, 
‘Posted Workers: Single market or protection of national labour law systems?’ (1997) 34 
CMLR 571-602.
12  Former EC Treaty articles 57(2) and 66 concerning the free provision of services.
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ers are provided with the same opportunity to negotiate their wages and 
that therefore the equal treatment of posted and domestic workers is 
achieved.
On the other hand, if we are to say that the aim of the Directive is to 
facilitate the provision of services as well as to protect the rights of work-
ers, we would come to a different conclusion and say that a Member State 
would have to enact new legislation. Only by doing so could such a Mem-
ber State offer suffi cient protection to workers, because otherwise post-
ed workers would enjoy no protection at all regarding the host Member 
State.13 However, one might object that the Directive is based on Articles 
regarding the free provision of services and not on those regarding social 
rights. How could it then protect workers as well? Perhaps the answer 
can be found in Defrenne II14 and Viking,15 where the Court emphasised 
that the European Union is not merely an economic union, but also a so-
cial one. In addition, according to British American Tobacco,16 a directive 
can pursue additional aims besides those which it is based on. Finally, 
a piece of legislation has to strike a fair balance between the various in-
terests concerned,17 and the Posted Workers Directive can do so only if it 
protects the rights of workers as well as those of  service providers. 
2. The implementation of the Directive
When implementing the Posted Workers Directive and therefore de-
termining the minimum wage applicable to posted workers, a Member 
State must make sure to do so in a way which respects the general rules 
of implementation. Therefore, it must implement it in a clear and precise 
manner which allows individuals to be fully aware of their rights and 
obligations.18 According to the well established case law, the implementa-
13  This might be problematic if the home Member State which posted workers come from 
uses the same system and prescribes no minimum wages at all. In this case, undertakings 
which post workers are formally not obliged to pay any minimum rate of pay. Since, on the 
one hand, domestic workers de facto enjoy a certain level of pay which they negotiate in 
practice, and on the other, posted workers are not protected at all because of their weak ne-
gotiating powers, this situation in practice leads to discrimination against posted workers. 
14  Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena 
[1976] ECR 00455 par 10.
15  Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line EestiViking Line [2007] ECR 00000 par 79.
16  Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American To-
bacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR I-11453 par 82.
17  Commission (EC), ‘Posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services: 
maximising its benefi ts and potential while guaranteeing the protection of workers’ (Com-
munication) SEC (2007) 304 fi nal 13 June 2007 par 2.1.
18  Case 102/79 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [1980] 
ECR 01473 par 11; Case C-131/88 Commission of the European Communities v Federal 
Republic of Germany [1991] ECR I-00825 par 6.
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tion may be left to social partners and done by collective agreements.19 
This Directive is no exception. What is more, its very provisions20 say that 
the terms and conditions of employment for posted workers are to be laid 
down by laws, regulations, administrative provisions, and in some cases 
even by collective agreements or arbitration awards that have been de-
clared to be of universal application. At this point we must take into con-
sideration the differences in the social models of various Member States. 
2. a) Regulating the minimum wage through legislative provisions
Some Member States, like France, Greece and Spain, regulate the 
minimum wage through legislative provisions. These Member States have 
a rather easy task when implementing the Directive - they should make it 
clear from their legislation that the prescribed domestic minimum wage 
applies to posted workers as well. In other words, these Member States 
only have to extend their way of determining minimum pay to posted 
workers. The result is that all the workers on their territory, both do-
mestic and posted ones, are subject to the same regime regarding the 
minimum wage. This is very satisfactory from the perspective of the prin-
ciple of equality and is an effective form of prevention of social dumping, 
though only up to a certain point. As recital 13 reminds us, this Directive 
is only meant to ensure certain minimum terms and conditions of em-
ployment for posted workers. Therefore, since it can only ensure equal 
minimum wages and not equal pay in general, it cannot completely elimi-
nate the possibility of social dumping, but can only reduce it. Some of 
the older Member States might not feel comfortable with this, while newer 
ones might fi nd the Directive’s solution suitable for exploiting their com-
petitive advantage of a cheaper workforce. The Directive actually offers a 
compromise between these two interests, a compromise which the Court 
recently confi rmed.21
2. b) Regulating the minimum wage through collective agreements
Article 3 states that the Directive can be implemented through col-
lective agreements which have been declared universally applicable. Par-
agraph 8 of the same Article is more specifi c about the meaning of the 
term “universally applicable”. It says that these are collective agreements 
which ‘must be observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and 
19  Case C-143/83 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark [1985] 
ECR 00427 par 8; C-234/97 Teresa Fernández de Bobadilla v Museo Nacional del Prado, 
Comité de Empresa del Museo Nacional del Prado and Ministerio Fiscal [1999] ECR I-04773 
par 19.
20  Article 3(1) of the Posted Workers Directive.
21  Viking Line (n 15) and Laval (n 7) cases.
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in the profession or industry concerned’. No problems occur for Member 
States if they have a system for declaring collective agreements univer-
sally applicable and have used the system for their own workers, as they 
only have to declare the collective agreements universally applicable to 
posted workers as well. This will result in the equality of treatment of 
both posted and domestic workers. It is also quite convenient for foreign 
undertakings which post workers, because the applicable minimum wage 
can easily be determined. A number of Member States, like Germany and 
Austria, chose to implement the Directive in this way. 
Still, some Member States do not have a system for declaring collec-
tive agreements universally applicable. Can they nevertheless implement 
the Directive through collective agreements? The second subparagraph 
of Article 3(8) gives an affi rmative answer. These Member States have an 
option to base themselves on collective agreements ‘which are generally 
applicable to all similar undertakings in the geographical area and in 
the profession or industry concerned’ or those ‘concluded by the most 
representative employers’ and labour organizations at national level’ and 
applied throughout national territory. If they decide to do so, they must 
explicitly say so in their legislation implementing the Directive. Only then 
is the requirement of clear and precise implementation satisfi ed. How-
ever, it is important to stress that the option provided for in Article 3(8)2 
can only be used if a Member State has no system for declaring collec-
tive agreements universally applicable.22 According to the Commission’s 
Communication from 2003,23 none of the Member States made use of 
this option so it remained only a theoretical possibility, and a contentious 
one. Perhaps the best way to show why is to analyse the Laval case.
3. The Posted Workers Directive and Article 49 - the cases of Laval 
and Dirk Rüffert
3. a) Laval 
Sweden was one of those Member States which had no system for 
declaring collective agreements universally applicable and which did not 
use the option in Article 3 (8) to rely on generally applicable collective 
agreements. It has a tradition of non-interference in labour relations re-
garding wages, so it left the trade unions to negotiate the wages with 
foreign employers, as they do with domestic ones. That is just what hap-
pened in Laval. A Latvian undertaking posted approximately 35 of its 
workers on a building site in Sweden. It had previously signed a collective 
22  The Court confi rmed this in case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsent [2008] 
ECR 00000 par 27.
23  Commission (EC) ‘The implementation of Directive 96/71/ EC in the Member States’ 
(Communication) COM (2003) 458 fi nal 25 July 2003. 
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agreement with a Latvian trade union. However, it did not sign a col-
lective agreement with the Swedish trade unions. Swedish trade unions 
requested an hourly wage based on statistics for that region and that 
profession and they requested that Laval sign a collective agreement re-
garding other terms and conditions of employment. When Laval refused, 
the trade unions made a new offer and agreed to negotiate the wages with 
Laval if it signed an agreement which had a so-called fall-back clause. 
The wage from such a clause, which is lower than the usual one for that 
profession and region, is used if negotiations on wages fail. Since the ne-
gotiations were unsuccessful, the trade unions started collective action 
by blockading the building site where Laval worked. Mediation meetings 
were held during the collective action, but no agreement was reached. 
The fi rst legal issue which occurred was whether Sweden had prop-
erly transposed the Directive by omitting to prescribe the minimum wage 
either by law, regulation, administrative provision or collective agree-
ments declared universally applicable. The trade unions argued that 
Sweden had properly transposed the Directive by leaving the wage to 
be determined by both sides of industry. In this way, they tried to argue 
that they had the right to ensure the wage through collective action. The 
Court concurred with the argument that the Directive does not require 
the minimum wage to be prescribed by means envisaged by the Direc-
tive. It expressly stated that it was not the purpose of the Posted Workers 
Directive to harmonise the systems for establishing terms and conditions 
of employment.24 In other words, Member States do not have to make any 
changes in their legislation due to the Directive.25 However, they will want 
to prescribe wages in ways envisaged by the Directive, as will be shown 
later in the text.
The next legal issue which occurred was whether the collective ac-
tion of the trade unions was a justifi ed restriction on the free provision 
of services even if the Directive had not been improperly transposed.26 
It has to be pointed out that the trade unions required negotiations on 
wages and the signing of collective agreements which related to matters 
not envisaged by the Directive, since this is of crucial importance in the 
explanation of the judgement. 
The Court fi rstly made two general statements to provide guidance 
to Member States on how to legislate on minimum wages if they are to 
impose them on foreign employers. The fi rst was that no wage except the 
24  Laval (n 7) par 67, 68.
25  However, Member States have to guarantee posted workers the same level of minimum 
wages if those minimum wages are prescribed in one of the ways envisaged by the Directive.
26  There were some legal issues in Laval which are not specifi c to minimum wages, like the 
scope of application of EC law regarding fundamental rights and the issue of the binding 
nature of Article 49 on individuals.
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minimum may be imposed on foreign service providers27 (and no other 
terms and conditions of employment except those envisaged by the Di-
rective).28 Thus, if domestic workers can be paid lower than the amount 
required for posted workers, then the measure is contrary to the Direc-
tive (Laval was fi rst required to pay the average wage for the region and 
profession, and then after the blockade had started it was required to 
sign the collective agreement as a condition for starting negotiations on 
wages). This was in conformity with the Court’s judgment in Portugaia 
Construções where it is stated that such a measure would be directly 
discriminatory.
The second statement was that the minimum wage has to be pre-
scribed in one of the ways envisaged by the Directive, otherwise it can-
not be enforced in respect of posted workers.29 Therefore, Swedish ne-
gotiations on a case-by-case basis breached the Directive.  The reason 
behind this requirement is, as the Court itself stated, the incapability 
of foreign employers to ascertain the wages which they are to pay their 
posted workers.30 The Court pointed out that the Directive expressly lays 
down the degree of protection for posted workers and that otherwise the 
Directive would be deprived of its effectiveness. It seems that the Court 
views the Directive as an instrument of simplifying the rules which are 
to be applied to foreign service providers rather than an instrument for 
enhanced workers’ protection. It could, therefore, be said that the Court 
fi nds the added value of the Directive in its pursuit of limiting the ways 
in which foreign service providers may be obliged to respect the wages of 
a home Member State. Unlike Article 49, which does not a priori preclude 
certain ways of prescribing minimum wages, the Community’s legislature 
does exactly this.  
After these rather general statements, the Court turned to the ques-
tion of specifi c collective action. What the trade unions required were ne-
gotiations on pay and certain terms and conditions of employment. The 
Court recognised that ensuring that the terms of employment are fi xed 
at a certain level falls within the legitimate objective of protecting work-
27  Laval (n 7) par 70.
28  The trade unions required, besides the negotiations on wages, certain terms of employ-
ment which may be required by the Directive only on grounds of public policy. It was ruled 
by the Court that only a Member State may rely on grounds of public policy envisaged by 
the Directive and not trade unions since they are not bodies governed by public law. At fi rst 
sight, it might seem that only bodies governed by public law may rely on public policy as 
general grounds for justifi cation. This would be in direct contradiction with the judgment in 
Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921. However, this part of Laval should probably 
be understood as precluding bodies which are not governed by public law from relying only 
on these provisions of the Directive and not public policy in general.
29  Laval (n 7)  par 70.
30  Ibid par 71.
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ers. However, it stated that these specifi c obligations, precisely because 
co-ordination has been achieved by the Directive, cannot be imposed on 
the employer since they go beyond what is prescribed by the Directive.31 
Therefore, it can be said that the Community’s legislature has prescribed 
what is to be considered as a disproportionate burden for the employer 
compared to the protection of workers.
The second reason why collective action could not have been justi-
fi ed was that the trade unions required negotiations on pay. In effect, 
they were not requiring any specifi c wage. This was considered by the 
Court to be part of a national context which is not suffi ciently precise 
and accessible for foreign employers to determine their obligations.32 
The Court actually used the wording from Arblade but in a somewhat 
different context. In Arblade the Court precluded criminal prosecution 
because of imprecise provisions while in Laval it was collective action 
which was precluded. It is understandable why the Court used the prin-
ciple nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which is actually a specifi c 
form of a general principle of legal certainty in Arblade, but it is rather 
vague why it used it in relations between two private persons like trade 
unions and an undertaking.33 It is possible that the Court considered 
that the effect of collective action on Laval as an undertaking would have 
been similar to criminal prosecution. After all, the collective action had 
been conducted in the form of a blockade disabling construction abso-
lutely and had resulted in the bankruptcy of an undertaking in Laval’s 
ownership. On the other hand, the Court did not use these arguments 
and it seems that legal certainty is a requirement for any impediment to 
the free provision of services, even one which is the result of the actions 
of individuals. 
The question now is what Sweden can do to protect its workers from 
social dumping. The answer is quite simple, as it just has to avail itself 
of Article 3 (8), which exists specifi cally for systems like Sweden’s. The 
system has to base itself on collective agreements which are generally 
applicable to all similar undertakings in the region and in the profes-
sion or industry, or it can base itself on collective agreements concluded 
between labour and employers’ organisations at the national level. It can 
be argued that the Directive signifi cantly changes the current model of 
case-by-case negotiations, and this is actually what it does, as it makes it 
absolutely impossible in cases involving the posting of workers. However, 
on the other hand, it is quite questionable to what extent case-by-case 
31  Ibid par 107, 108.
32  Ibid par 110.
33  Par 110 of Laval can also be viewed as an application of the test of proportionality, since 
an imprecise and unclear requirement on the part of trade unions could be seen as a more 
restrictive measure than a demand for a specifi c wage.
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negotiations are really necessary for workers’ protection and the preven-
tion of social dumping. The Community’s legislature obviously considers 
that the wages negotiated in a certain region and profession for domestic 
workers ought to be enough for posted workers and ought to be enough 
to prevent social dumping in that Member State. In Sweden, such col-
lective agreements do exist, although they come into force and provide 
the fall-back wage only if negotiations in situ fail. Thus, these collective 
agreements provide a level of workers’ protection which is guaranteed to 
all workers in a given profession and region and should be considered as 
minimal terms and conditions of employment. Therefore, the only way for 
Sweden to prevent social dumping is to rely on such agreements.
It can be concluded that the model envisaged by the Directive helps 
all those employers posting workers to ascertain their obligations before 
posting them, without having an obligation to engage in lengthy nego-
tiations (which they probably had to carry out in their home state). The 
Court gives the Directive an interpretation which is more benefi cial to 
free movement than to the protection of workers. Another important case 
that is crucial for the understanding of the Directive is Dirk Rüffert, but 
as we shall see, some questions, such as the relationship between the 
Directive and Article 49, still remain unanswered.
3. b) Dirk Rüffert
A German undertaking subcontracted a Polish one to perform pub-
lic works in Germany. The Polish undertaking used its own workers and 
paid them a wage which was lower than the one prescribed by the “Build-
ings and public works” collective agreement in force in the place where 
the work was carried out. According to the laws of Land Niedersachsen, 
a public contract may be awarded only to a tenderer which guarantees to 
pay its workers the wage prescribed by the “Buildings and public works” 
collective agreement. Therefore the contract was terminated. However, 
the problem was that such a collective agreement could not be used to 
determine minimum wages to be applied to posted workers since it did 
not fulfi l the requirements in the Posted Workers Directive. First of all, 
it was not declared universally applicable. Secondly, it did not cover the 
entire construction sector but only public contracts, thus it could not 
even be considered to be of general application within the meaning of 
Article 3(8) of the Directive. What is more, generally applicable collective 
agreements could be relied upon only when a Member State did not have 
a system of declaring collective agreements universally applicable and 
Germany did have such a system. Consequently, the Court ruled that 
imposing a minimum wage determined by such a collective agreement 
was capable of constituting a restriction on the free provision of services. 
Let us analyse its arguments more closely.
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The Posted Workers Directive lists minimum terms and conditions 
of employment that should be guaranteed to posted workers. As con-
fi rmed in Laval, a Member State cannot impose on foreign undertakings 
any other wage higher than the minimum wage. If it could, the Directive 
would then be deprived of its effectiveness.34 Since the German contract-
ing authority did so in a public procurement procedure, the Court in 
Rüffert repeated its reasoning from Laval. However, a special issue is the 
fact that this case was about a public procurement contract. Can the 
Posted Workers Directive infl uence the area of national public procure-
ment law and change the criteria for the award of public procurement 
contracts? The Court ruled that it could. Directive 96/71 applies to all 
situations when undertakings post workers, no matter whether they will 
be working in the private or public sector.35
A separate issue was the fact that in Land Niedersachsen minimum 
wages were not prescribed according to the procedures laid down in the Di-
rective. According to the reasoning in Laval, these minimum wages could 
therefore not be imposed on foreign undertakings. Of course, this is in line 
with what the Court had said in Laval - that Member States are free to 
choose a system for determining the minimum wage which is not expressly 
mentioned in the Directive. However, they cannot impose minimum wages 
determined in such a way on foreign undertakings. Therefore, Member 
States now have a choice - they can either determine the minimum wage 
in a procedure envisaged by the Directive and then impose them on foreign 
undertakings, or not determine them in such a way and consequently not 
have the right to oblige foreign undertakings to pay them. 
Yet another point raised in Rüffert concerns the aim of the Posted 
Workers Directive. The Court explicitly said that it is secondary to the 
fundamental freedom of provision of services and should therefore be 
read in the light of Article 49.36 Of course, this does not necessarily mean 
that the Directive has no social purpose at all, but just that its basic and 
more important goal is to facilitate the free provision of services. This can 
be seen from the fact that if a Member State has a minimum wage pre-
scribed in a way envisaged by the Directive, it has to guarantee that rate 
of pay to posted workers as well. The Court further established that im-
posing rates of pay that are not determined in accordance with the Direc-
tive is capable of constituting a restriction of Article 49.37 Finally, there is 
one last question to examine. Could the German authorities justify such 
an action? Are there any circumstances which would warrant the impo-
34 Laval (n 7) par 80.
35  Dirk Rüffert (n 22) par 20.
36  Ibid par 36.
37  Ibid par 37.
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sition of a rate of pay that is higher than the minimum one, and which 
is not fi xed in accordance with the Posted Workers Directive? The Court 
ruled that in the present case it could not be justifi ed by the objective of 
the protection of workers. Since the contested collective agreement and 
therefore minimum wage applied only to construction workers when em-
ployed in the context of a public works contract, the collective agreement 
did not even offer the same level of protection to all domestic workers.38 
Why should it then be imposed on posted workers, and why would they 
constitute a threat to domestic workers employed under a public works 
contract when domestic workers employed elsewhere were not consid-
ered to be so? Furthermore, the Court ruled that such a measure was 
not necessary to avoid the risk of seriously undermining the fi nancial 
balance of the social security system.39 However, if it were necessary, the 
Court’s conclusion might have been different and it might have said that 
such a measure was justifi ed. 
Yet, one cannot help but wonder whether this would be in conform-
ity with the thesis put forward by Advocate General Mengozzi that even 
though the Directive implements Article 49, not every measure that is 
in accordance with the Directive will at the same time necessarily be 
compatible with Article 49. Still, a measure that is incompatible with 
the Directive will also constitute a breach of Article 49. As the Advocate 
General puts it, ‘the Directive does not exhaust the application of Article 
49’.40 If this is the case, why would it be necessary to examine whether 
a measure breaches Article 49 once it has been determined that it is in-
compatible with the Directive? And this is exactly what the Court does in 
Laval and Rüffert. It fi rstly establishes that the demand of the trade un-
ions in Laval and the method of fi xing the rate of pay in Rüffert are not in 
conformity with the Directive and then goes further and establishes that 
the measures are also contrary to Article 49. Unfortunately, the Court 
does not answer this question for us, but only states that it must fi rst ‘be 
examined with regard to the provisions of that directive interpreted in the 
light of Article 49 EC, and, where appropriate, with regard to the latter 
provision itself’.41 One might therefore argue that if a Member State de-
termines the minimum wage in a way which is not in accordance with the 
Posted Workers Directive, but is still clear and precise enough for foreign 
undertakings, such a minimum wage would be in conformity with Article 
49.42 Therefore the Court would have to check every time whether the way 
38  Ibid par 39, 40.
39  Ibid par 42.
40  Opinion of AG Mengozzi on Laval [2007] ECR 00000 par 147.
41  Laval (n 7) par 61.
42  Such an interpretation might seem to be contrary to paragraph 70 of the Laval judge-
ment and 31 of Rüffert, but nevertheless, seems to be in accordance with paragraph 110 
of Laval.
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of determining the rate of pay contravenes the Directive and separately 
whether it contravenes Article 49. However, for the time being, this ques-
tion remains unanswered. 
To conclude, in the past twenty years the Court has gradually been 
developing the conditions under which Member States may impose their 
wages on foreign service providers. The most recent answer is that they 
may only impose the minimum wage which applies to their own workers 
and which is set in a clear and precise manner in accordance with the 
Posted Workers Directive. 
Having described the present situation in the European Union, we 
shall now focus on the situation in Croatia. The following part of the ar-
ticle will deal with the problem of ensuring the minimum wage for posted 
workers in Croatia in the light of Croatia’s obligations and/or rights as a 
potential candidate to the European Union. We shall begin by examining 
the nature, interpretation and application of the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreement which gives Croatia the status of potential candidate. 
III. Minimum wages in Croatia in the light of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement
When the Court gave its judgments in Laval and Rüffert it also gave 
an unexpected interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive. Naturally, 
Member States are bound to respect its rulings. Even though Croatia is 
not a Member State, it has an obligation to comply with the Community 
acquis since it gained the status of potential candidate by signing the Sta-
bilisation and Association Agreement (hereinafter the SAA). The Posted 
Workers Directive is part of the acquis, but what about the Court’s rul-
ings that come with the Directive, like Laval and Rüffert? Does the SAA 
create an obligation to comply with the judgments of the Court as well?
We shall try to answer what the obligations of Croatia are regarding 
the SAA, but fi rstly, in order to facilitate understanding of the SAA, we 
shall explore its nature and purpose.   
1. The nature and purpose of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement signed with Croatia
For the purpose of ensuring closer ties with Non-Member States, the 
European Union developed a new form of association agreement, the Sta-
bilisation and Association Agreement, which gives a Non-Member State 
the status of potential candidate. Croatia signed a Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreement on 29 October 2001, and it came into force on 1 Feb-
ruary 2005. This kind of association agreement is based on Article 310 of 
the EC Treaty, which states that ‘The Community may conclude with one 
or more States or international organisations agreements establishing an 
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association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action 
and special procedure.’43 
Association agreements44 represent an act of the Community and 
therefore form an integral part of the Community acquis, as the Court 
confi rmed in the Haegeman judgment: ‘The Agreement is therefore, in 
so far as concerns the Community, an act of one of the Institutions of 
the Community. The provisions of the agreement form an integral part 
of Community law’.45 Within the framework of this law, the Court has 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of 
association agreements. 
Unlike the previous Europe Agreements,46 which were signed with 
Central and Eastern European Countries, SAAs do not guarantee full 
membership of the European Union.47 
The question that inevitably follows is what is the Union trying to 
do with Stabilisation and Association Agreements? The answer may be 
considered simple, since the Court held in the Demirel48 judgment that 
43  To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria (Copenhagen):
political: the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities;
economic: the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
acceptance of the Community acquis: the ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
44  What is more, the Court held in the Sevince judgment that not only association agree-
ments, but also the provisions adopted for the implementation of an association agreement 
concluded by the Council and a non-member country, form an integral part of the Com-
munity legal system in the same way as the agreement itself, so that the Court, which has 
jurisdiction on the basis of Article 234 of the Treaty to give rulings on the agreement which 
was adopted as an act of the institutions, also has jurisdiction to give rulings on their inter-
pretation, this being conducive to the uniform application of Community law.
45  Case 181/73 R. & V Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 00449 par 4, 5.
46  Europe Agreements were mixed agreements, that is they were agreements concluded 
with a third state and to which the European Communities were party as well as its member 
states. Europe Agreements were based on a mutual understanding and the shared values 
peculiar to the European Community and the associate state. They prepared the way for 
economic, political, social and cultural convergence between the Union and its partners.
47  The original text of Europe Agreements was not formulated in a way which would guar-
antee full membership. However, the European Council in Copenhagen (1993) acknowl-
edged accession/membership as a mutual goal of the Union and the contracting parties. 
Later on, in Essen (1996) the Council gave new meaning to the Copenhagen strategy, which 
made the EA a part of the accession process. Thus, the preamble of the European Agree-
ments signed with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia signed after Essen have an ad-
ditional paragraph. For example, the Europe Agreement signed with Slovenia states in the 
last paragraph of the preamble: “Recognising the fact that Slovenia’s ultimate objective is 
to accede to the European Union, and that this Association, in the view of the parties, will 
help Slovenia to achieve this objective.”
48  Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 03719 par 9.
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association agreements create special rights and privileged links with a 
non-member country which must, at least to a certain extent, take part 
in the Community system. Does this mean that the Union is recruiting 
without following through? Is the Union performing some kind of ini-
tiation process knowing that the participant list is full? To what end do 
SAAs extend? 
The answer to these questions may be found in the Declaration en-
dorsed in Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003, which explicitly states: 
The EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspec-
tive of the Western Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans is 
within the European Union. Preparation for integration into Euro-
pean structures and ultimate membership into the European Union, 
through adoption of European standards, is now the big challenge 
ahead.49 
Does this mean that the nature of the SAA with Croatia has reached 
a new level? May the SAA now be acknowledged as an instrument for at-
taining full membership as a mutual goal of the Union and Croatia? 
Let us go back to the text of the preamble of the SAA signed with 
Croatia, which in a way repeats the sense of the Court’s judgment in 
Demirel: 
 … the European Union’s readiness to integrate to the fullest pos-
sible extent Croatia into the political and economic mainstream of 
Europe and its status as a potential candidate for EU membership 
subject to the successful implementation of this Agreement, notably 
regarding regional co-operation.50  
Thus, co-operation depends on Croatia and its readiness to direct its 
activities towards the attainment of full membership, which, however is 
not guaranteed, or, in fact, can it be considered that it is? 
What is more, by signing this agreement, Croatia undertook the ob-
ligation to ensure that existing laws and future legislation will be made 
compatible with the Community acquis.51 Since the Court’s case law also 
constitutes an integral part of the Community acquis, this obligation also 
includes co-ordination with the judgments of the Court.52 
49  Thessaloniki 21 June 2003. 10229/03 (Presse 163), <http://www.cespi.it/STOCCHI-
ERO/dossierBalcani/dich-Salonicco.PDF> accessed 25 June 2008.
50  The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States, and the Republic of Croatia; preamble.
51  Article 69 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement: The Parties recognise the 
importance of the approximation of Croatia’s existing legislation to that of the Community. 
Croatia shall endeavour to ensure that its existing laws and future legislation will be gradu-
ally made compatible with the Community acquis.
52  See the judgment of the Constitutional Court of Croatia No U-III-1410/2007 and more 
in the conclusion. 
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A more interesting question is whether agreements signed between 
the Community and third parties confer rights to individuals which 
national courts are bound to protect. An explanation was given in the 
Demirel judgment: 
… a provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with 
non Member State countries must be regarded as being directly 
applicable when, regard being had to its wording and the purpose 
and the nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear 
and precise obligation which is not subject in its implementation 
and effects to the adoption of any subsequent measure.53 (emphasis 
added) 
As we can see, the Court accepted the same criteria for the direct 
effect of international agreements (clear and precise) as it used for the 
direct application of the Treaty and secondary legislation, beginning with 
Van Gend en Loos.54 Thus, if the provision of the SAA is clear and precise 
it confers rights to individuals which national courts of Member States 
are bound to protect.
We must bear in mind, however, that although Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements form an integral part of the Community acquis, 
and even though their provisions may have a direct effect, they are still 
international agreements and can be interpreted in a different way by 
each contracting party. Thus, SAAs sometimes may not be interpreted in 
the same way as Community legislation. They have to be interpreted in 
the light of their nature and purpose.55  
2. Ensuring the minimum wage for posted workers, obligations or/
and rights in the light of the SAA
The whole debate over the obligations of Member States regarding 
minimum wages in the light of the Posted Workers Directive sheds an-
other, new light on the obligations or rights of a Non-Member State which 
has signed an SAA and attained the status of a potential candidate, and 
thus committed itself to the approximation of its existing legislation to 
that of the Community. 
53  Demirel (n 48) par 14.
54  Sinisa Rodin, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement in the Legal Order of the Euro-
pean Community and the Republic of Croatia’ (2003) 53 ZPFZ 3, 4. 
55  Case 270/80 Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc v Harlequin Records Shops Limited 
and Simons Records Limited [1982] ECR 00329. However, it must be noted that the nature 
and purpose of the provisions of the SAA are sometimes the same as the nature and pur-
pose of the relevant Treaty provisions (see case C-265/03 Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de 
Education y Cultura [2005] ECR I-02579 and case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund eV v 
Maros Kolpak [2003] ECR I-04135).
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The following question arises: what are the obligations or rights of 
a Non-Member State potential candidate regarding minimum wages for 
posted workers? 
2. a) The present regulation of the minimum wage in Croatia
While this article was in the process of being written, the Croatian 
Parliament enacted the Minimum Wage Act. The Act came into force on 
1 July 2008. 
The social and economic situation in Croatia has changed the views 
of trade unions regarding the previous regulation of the minimum wage 
through collective agreements. According to the Union Association of In-
dependent Trade Unions of Croatia (UATUC),56 the weak negotiating posi-
tion of Croatian trade unions has led them to the conclusion that only an 
act on minimum wages can and will solve the problem of not respecting 
the collectively bargained minimum wage. Thus, the trade unions pro-
posed a new act on minimum wages.  
The Act has no explicit provision referring to its applicability to post-
ed workers. As stated in the text of the Act, the minimum wage is to be 
guaranteed to all workers who work in Croatia.57 Such a provision may be 
read in a way that it equally, though indirectly, refers to posted workers 
since they will also work in Croatia, even if only temporarily.58
Prior to the enactment of the Minimum Wage Act, Croatia fell within 
the group of Member States like, for example, Austria, Denmark and Ger-
many, in which minimum rates of pay are regulated by collective agree-
ments.59 In Croatia, however, the term used was the lowest wage and not 
the minimum wage. The Collective Agreement on the lowest wage was 
signed on the 6 March 1998. On the basis of the Decision of the Minister 
of Labour and Social Security, the collective agreement in question was 
declared universally applicable,60 that is its application was extended to 
56  The proposal on the Minimum Wage Act: <http://www.sssh.hr/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=136&Itemid=78> accessed 30 June 2008.
57  Article 3 of the Minimum Wage Act ‘ lanak 3. Pravo na minimalnu pla u, prema odred-
bama ovoga Zakona, imaju svi radnici koji rade u Republici Hrvatskoj’.
58  It is, however, possible that the Croatian legislature did not have this in mind when it 
was writing the text of the Act. The Chapter of the Association process that refers to legisla-
tion of the European Union, which includes the Posted Workers Directive, was opened on 
17 June 2008, and the Act was enacted less than a month before on 30 May 2008.
59 The lowest wage, which in practice, is identifi ed with the minimum wage, depended on 
the average wage multiplied by a coeffi cient of 0.35, which constitutes  the lowest monthly 
base, as determined by the Contribution of Compulsory Insurance Act. The average wage 
was calculated on the basis of the monthly wage paid per one employed person in a legal 
person in Croatia during the period from January to August of the current/liquid year as 
published by the Central Bureau of Statistics.  
60  ‘Collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally ap-
plicable’ means collective agreements or arbitration awards which must be observed by all 
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all employers and employees in Croatia. Therefore, Croatia had one of the 
systems provided for in the Directive, a system for declaring collective 
agreements universally applicable, and had used it on its own workers. 
Thus, Croatia as a Member State would have had the obligation to extend 
that collective agreement to all posted workers in accordance with Article 
3 (1) of the Directive. 
We must bear in mind that collective agreements are more fl exible 
and thus are easier to alter.61 Since, however, the workers have a “weak” 
negotiating position, the level of effi cient protection of workers through 
collective agreements is signifi cantly lower. Even though acts are more 
diffi cult to amend, the protection of workers by legislative acts is some-
what higher.62 
The new Minimum Wage Act explicitly establishes very high pecuni-
ary penalties up to HRK 100,000 (approximately EUR 13,870) for non-
compliance with the proscribed minimum wage.
2. b) Obligations and/or rights arising from the SAA
We believe that the obligations or rights arising from the SAA do 
not differ that much, especially regarding the minimum wage for posted 
workers, from the obligations Croatia will have as a Member State.
Firstly, Croatia has the duty to approximate laws, competition rules 
and law enforcement, which arises from Article 69 of the SAA. This states: 
The Parties recognise the importance of the approximation of 
Croatia’s existing legislation to that of the Community. Croatia shall 
endeavour to ensure that its existing laws and future legislation will 
be gradually made compatible with the Community acquis.
Even though there is no direct obligation resulting from this Article, 
the undertaken political obligation necessitates the legal obligation as 
well, and is binding on Croatian courts.
Secondly, the political ties between the Union and Croatia have 
grown stronger as a result of the Declaration adopted in Thessaloniki on 
undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned (Article 
3 (8) of the Posted Workers Directive).
61  If there is more then one union in a fi eld where a collective agreement is to be concluded, 
an employer or employers’ association can bargain only with a collective bargaining com-
mittee composed of representatives of such unions (Art 186(1) Labour Act). If unions cannot 
reach an agreement on the number of members of the collective bargaining committee, the 
decision shall be made by the Chairman of the Economic and Social Council, taking into 
consideration the number of the unions’ members. On the  request of the chairman of the 
Economic and Social Council, the employer and employers’ association have to provide him 
with all the data they have on the number of the unions’ members (Art 186 (4)).
62 Ivana Grgurev, ‘Collective agreements in Croatia’ <http://www.juridicum.su.se/stock-
holmcongress2002/> accessed 5 June 2008.
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21 June 2003,63 which recognised that the future of our region is within 
the European Union. Moreover, preparations for integration into Europe-
an structures and ultimate membership of the European Union through 
the adoption of European standards have been at the top of the political 
agenda in Croatia during recent years. 
Finally, according to Article 56 of the SAA, Croatia has a duty to take 
the necessary steps to progressively allow the supply of services and, ac-
cording to Article 57, will not take any measures or actions which render 
the conditions for the supply of services more diffi cult. However, it is 
questionable whether Articles 56 has a direct effect, because it is subject 
and closely linked to the process of the liberalisation of services in the EU 
and to the activities of the Association and Stabilisation Council.64 Still, 
the liberalisation of services in the European Union has recently been 
reinforced by the adoption of the new Services Directive 2006/123, so it 
might be claimed that Article 56 has a direct effect.65 On the other hand, 
Article 57, which is a stand-still clause, has a direct effect because it is a 
precise, clear and unconditional provision.66
In the light of the above-mentioned reasons, we consider that Croatia, 
as a potential candidate, has the right, and not so much the obligation, 
stemming from the SAA to apply the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act 
to posted workers. 
Croatia has the right to apply the same Act to posted workers, but all 
the reasons mentioned above are too unclear and imprecise as to whether 
they are suffi cient to create a real obligation. 
More importantly, since the SAA is an international agreement, 
Croatia as a contracting party is free to determine the legal means ap-
propriate for attaining the end pursued by the same agreement.67 Thus, 
whether Croatian courts will interpret the Minimum Wage Act as being 
applicable to posted workers and thus protect their rights is yet to be 
seen. The Croatian legislature has used a wide formulation, as has been 
mentioned, for the obligation of ensuring the minimum wage. 
Applying the Minimum Wage Act to posted workers would be the 
best solution when taking into account Croatia’s obligation to integrate 
to the fullest possible extent into the political and economic mainstream 
63  Thessaloniki 21 June 2003. 10229/03 (Presse 163), <http://www.cespi.it/STOCCHI-
ERO/dossierBalcani/dich-Salonicco.PDF> accessed 25 June 2008.
64  Iris Goldner, Sloboda kretanja ljudi u EU, Kontekst Sporazuma o pridruživanju (Zagreb 
2007) 33-49.
65  They have a stand-still clause character.
66  Iris Goldner, Sloboda kretanja ljudi u EU, Kontekst Sporazuma o pridruživanju (Zagreb 
2007) 113.
67  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v CA Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A [1987] ECR 3641 PAR.
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of Europe. Finally, as we have seen, Croatian legal solution for ensur-
ing the minimum wage for domestic workers is appropriate for ensuring 
the same wage for posted workers. In this way, posted workers will be 
guaranteed at least the Croatian minimum wage, naturally if it is higher 
than the minimum wage of the Member State from which the workers are 
posted. 
In the end, foreign service providers and posted workers depend 
on the willingness of Croatian courts to interpret the wide formulation 
used by the Croatian legislature and guarantee the proscribed minimum 
wage.  
IV. Conclusion
The freedom to provide services, as one of the fundamental freedoms 
upon which the Union is based, plays a crucial role in the Union’s econo-
my. Services participate to the extent of almost 70% of States’ GNP.68 This 
being a large amount of money, one cannot be wrong when assuming 
that it is bound to be an object of various interests. One of these can be 
found in Member States’ desire to control the infl uence of foreign service 
providers on their social stability and own national service providers. 
Surely, the minimum wage is one of the ways in which a Member State 
can infl uence the movement of services within its territory. Since it is 
also is an important instrument of Member States’ social policy, it is the 
one that they are not likely to make compromises over. In contrast, the 
interests of the Union lie in the liberalisation of the provision of services. 
However, differences in minimum wages and in methods of establishing 
them can stand in the way of this goal. This is why the European Court 
of Justice has set certain boundaries to the application of host Member 
States’ minimum wages to foreign services providers. First, the Court 
tested the water in Rush Portuguesa and led us to believe that there were 
no boundaries at all. However, in later judgements, Arblade, Mazzoleni 
and Portugaia Construções, the Court applied the general principles of 
non-discrimination, legal certainty and proportionality to the host State’s 
regulation of minimum wages and its enforcement. The Posted Work-
ers Directive brought more challenges, but the unpredictable came with 
Laval. 
The judgement itself made a huge difference to Member States like 
Sweden which do not regulate a minimum wage. Furthermore, it restrict-
ed the exercise of the fundamental right to strike and last but not least, it 
stirred the existing status of economic and social rights in the Union. The 
68  Economic assessment of the barriers to the internal market for services, Final report, 
January 2005, Copenhagen Economics, <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/
docs/services-dir/studies/2005-01-cph-study_en.pdf> accessed 6 July 2008.
99CYELP 4 [2008] 75-100
difference that The Posted Workers Directive and Laval have made for 
Member States’ social systems is a rather indirect one. Even though the 
Directive does not harmonise the mandatory rules for minimum protec-
tion,69 it actually forces Member States to set a minimum wage in the way 
envisaged by the Directive. Otherwise, for the time being, it seems that 
a Member State cannot impose such a minimum wage on foreign service 
providers and therefore cannot confront the challenges of social dump-
ing.70 Regarding the way that Laval restricted the fundamental right to 
strike, it has to be noted that the Court imposed the principle of legal cer-
tainty upon private persons exercising their fundamental right. Thus, an 
important instrument for ensuring a certain wage level has been consid-
erably restrained. Adding restrictions to the social side of the European 
pendulum has resulted in the ever-growing sentiment of European citi-
zens that the Union is fi rst of all an economic union and only afterwards 
a social one. 
Who benefi ts from such a shift? While most of the old Member States 
have a long tradition of protecting social rights and thus have a higher 
level of minimum wages, newer ones try to benefi t from their main com-
petitive advantage - a low-cost workforce. With its rulings in Laval and 
Rüffert, the Court revealed a hidden paradise for undertakings from these 
new Member States. They are now free to profi t from the lack of regula-
tion of minimum wages in accordance with the Posted Workers Directive 
in several Member States, such as Sweden. Will Croatia be one of these 
new Member States? 
If the cake is the whole EU market, does the Union really need to ask 
us “Would you like a piece of it?” The European Union provides the pos-
sibility and Croatia must take it. The Union’s initiation process however 
is not an easy one. Croatia’s recruitment began with signing the SAA in 
2001 and is still in progress. At the time of writing this article, Croatia 
has opened a new Chapter of its accession to the EU which refers to leg-
islation of the European Union including the Posted Workers Directive. 
Only a few weeks earlier, Croatia had enacted the Minimum Wage Act 
on the initiative of Croatian trade unions which had proposed the act in 
question. Trade Unions were led by two factors - their weak negotiating 
position and the fact that 20 out of 27 Member States have some kind of 
legislation on minimum wages.
A separate question is whether Croatia has an obligation and/or 
right to ensure the minimum wage for workers that are posted to its ter-
ritory by a Community service provider. That is, how far does the SAA 
signed with the EU go? Croatia has the right to apply the Minimum Wage 
69  Laval (n 7) par 60.
70  For a full insight into the ambiguity of this question refer to point II. 3. b) of this article.
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Act to posted workers and this right can be protected by Croatian courts. 
The Croatian legislature uses a wide formulation: ‘the minimum wage 
is to be guaranteed to all workers who work in Croatia’. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the aforementioned provision refers to posted workers as 
well, since they will also work in Croatia, even if only temporarily.  
Furthermore, there is a tendency in Croatia’s Constitutional Court 
to make sure that the interpretation of the European Court and the legal 
terms developed within the Union and used in the SAA are respected. 
It seems that the Constitutional Court also takes into account the con-
text in which the Acts were enacted, that is, the context of ensuring the 
compatibility of laws and regulations with the Community acquis. What 
is more, when interpreting Croatian legislation, Croatian courts have an 
obligation to take into account to the fullest possible extent the inter-
pretation of Community Institutions. The Constitutional Court, however, 
set boundaries to this interpretation in its judgment U-III-1410/2007. 
The boundaries are that the interpretation must be in the light of the 
Croatian legal order and that it must not be contrary to explicit solutions 
provided for in legislation. 
It can be concluded that the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act 
and the case law of the Constitutional Court currently provide fi rm foun-
dations for the proper implementation of the Posted Workers Directive in 
Croatia. Certainly, Croatia is also well motivated to harmonise its legisla-
tion with that of the Community as soon as possible. Undertakings which 
post workers, as well as posted workers themselves, will therefore hope-
fully not have any problems regarding the determination of the minimum 
wage level while working in Croatia.
